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I. INTRODUCTION
While many scholars have studied the makeup and personalities
of the United States Supreme Court at points throughout history,
there have been no such comprehensive studies of the Washington
Supreme Court. The only major publication about the court's activity
is the annual compilation of caseload statistics from the Office of Ad-
ministrator for the Courts.' Apart from an occasional article in The
Washington State Bar News discussing major decisions during a term,
this field of legal scholarship is virtually barren. 2
This article presents a statistical snapshot of voting patterns
within the court at the turn of the century and then explores how the
changing makeup of the court may affect substantive areas of the law.
The Washington Supreme Court is in a state of transition; following
the November 2000 elections, only Justice Smith has served more than
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1. WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE COURTS, CASELOADS
OF THE COURTS OF WASHINGTON (2000) (published annually), available at http://www.
courts.wa.gov/caseload/supreme/homeOO.cfm (last visited April 13, 2002) [hereinafter
CASELOADS].
2. There is one study of Washington Supreme Court voting over the ten-year period of
1986-96. It is, however, limited to state constitutional criminal cases. See Laura L. Silva, State
Constitutional Criminal Adjudication in Washington Since State v. Gunwall: "Articulable, Reason-
able and Reasoned" Approach?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1871 (1997).
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ten years on the high court. Four of the nine justices are serving their
first terms. By looking at the opinions and voting records of both the
remaining and departing members of the court, we can make some
generalizations about the disposition of individual justices and even
blocs of justices. Analysis of the same data in a particular area of law
may also enable one to predict about future developments as well.
The Article begins with a brief discussion on its methodology.
Part III of the Article presents the statistics themselves with a brief
commentary. Part IV provides an analysis of the court, focusing on
voting patterns and particular types of issues that might be affected by
a changing court. This is done by examining seven criminal law cases
from the court during the term studied and one case from the succeed-
ing court.
II. METHODOLOGY
Because justices of the Washington Supreme Court are elected,
how a newly elected member participates is a natural point to begin
compiling statistics. Justice Ireland joined the court in November
1998. The first opinion she participated in was State v. Bencivenga,3
decided on April 15, 1999, setting the starting point of the study. The
statistics end with the change of the court following the November
2000 elections. Although a few opinions are still being published in
which departing Justices Guy and Talmadge participated, we set a
general cutoff point at the end of Washington Reports, Second Series,
volume 143. Early in the study, the membership of the court altered
again when Chief Justice Durham resigned, and Governor Locke ap-
pointed Justice Bridge to fill the vacancy. Because of this, the sam-
pling for those two justices is smaller than for the others.
During the study period, the court issued 234 written opinions.
Each opinion was analyzed to determine several facts. The first was
which lower appellate court's opinion was under review in order to de-
termine possible variances among the justices, based on geographical
divisions. The second datum recorded was who wrote the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions. The third was how each justice
voted. From that information, we created a matrix of alignment. A
small amount of judgment was used in evaluating certain concurring
opinions to determine whether they expressed full agreement or partial
agreement with the majority view. If, for example, the concurring
opinion stated agreement with the majority and the justice wrote it
solely to reply to a dissenting justice, that concurring opinion and the
3. 137 Wash. 2d 703, 974 P.2d 832 (1999). Because of its arguable significance, State v.
Demery, 144 Wash. 2d 753, 30 P.3d 1278 (2001), was also included.
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justices signing onto it were treated as signing onto the majority opin-
ion. By contrast, if the concurring opinion agreed with the result of
the majority opinion but disagreed with its rationale, the opinion and
those signing onto it were treated as having truly concurred. For pur-
poses of alignment, opinions that concurred in part and dissented in
part were generally treated as disagreeing with both the majority and
dissenting opinions.
In analyzing treatment of lower court decisions by geographical
area, only court of appeals decisions were included. That is, this study
looked at whether the supreme court was more likely to affirm or re-
verse any particular division of the court of appeals. Cases emanating
from a geographical area on direct review from the trial court were
treated separately.
One type of case merits special mention: the Personal Restraint
Petition (PRP). According to the Washington Supreme Court's pub-
lished caseloads for 2000, PRPs make up almost half of the court's
new cases.4 Most are not decided with published opinions, but some
are. During this study, almost sixty published opinions responded to
PRPs. For purposes of this study, they were treated as other decisions
(classified by appellate division or direct review and evaluated with re-
spect to treatment).
III. THE STATISTICS
A. Supreme Court's Relationship to Court of Appeals
1. Does the Court Have a Geographical Bias in Its Disposition of
Appeals?
Since the November 2000 elections left no member of the court
from Eastern Washington, one question is whether the court's
disposition of appeals shows any geographical biases. During the time
of this article's study, the court's makeup was skewed to the west as
well; only Justice Guy was from Division III. Five justices were from
Division I (all from King County), and one additional justice,
Madsen, had worked and lived in King County until she joined the
supreme court and presumably moved to Division II to be closer to
her place of employment. Two members of the court, Johnson and
Alexander, are from Division II.
4. CASELOADS, supra note 1, at 2, available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/caseload/
supreme/ann/2000/atbls00.pdf (last visited March 29, 2002).
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Nevertheless, the study results show no significant bias toward
any division, least of all toward Division I One hundred sixty-six
opinions came to the supreme court through the court of appeals. An
additional fifty-three opinions were for cases on direct review. Of the
cases from the court of appeals, seventy-two came from Division I
(43%), sixty-two came from Division 11 (37%), and thirty-two came
from Division III (19%).6 The decisions were classified into the fol-
lowing three categories: (1) decisions affirming the lower court; (2) de-
cisions reversing the lower court; and (3) decisions affirming the lower
court in part and reversing it in part.
The numbers for all divisions show that the supreme court af-
firmed the court of appeals seventy-seven times (46%), reversed it sev-
enty times (42%), and reversed it in part and affirmed it in part nine-
teen times (11%). Thus, by our methodology, the supreme court
reversed the court of appeals to at least some degree over 53% of the
time. As low as these numbers seem, the court of appeals fared much
better on review than the lower courts subject to direct review. There
were fifty-three cases in the study that went through direct review. Of
those, nineteen (36%) were affirmed, nineteen were reversed (36%),
and fifteen (28%) were affirmed in part and reversed in part. That
adds up to 64% of the cases on direct review being reversed to some
extent.
Within the geographical divisions, Divisions II and III actually
had the highest approval rating. Of these two, Division II had the
highest percentage of affirmed decisions. Of the sixty-two cases re-
viewed, thirty (48%) were affirmed; twenty-eight (45%) were reversed;
and four (6%) were affirmed in part and reversed in part. Although
Division II had a higher percentage of affirmed decisions, the latter
two numbers result in a higher percentage of reversed decisions in Di-
vision II than Division III. Of the thirty-two Division III cases re-
viewed, fifteen (47%) were affirmed, the same number and percentage
were reversed (47%), and two (6%) were affirmed in part and reversed
in part. That results in 53% of the division's reviewed cases being re-
versed in some part.
5. See infra App. B (Table 1).
6. CASELOADS, supra note 1, does not compile data on appeals to the Supreme Court by
appellate division. It does, however, contain the number of opinions issued by each division dur-
ing a calendar year. In 2000, Division I issued 917 opinions, id. at 9; Division II issued 551
opinions, id. at 10; and Division III issued 406 opinions, id. at 11. These numbers figure out to
43%, 29%, and 22% respectively. On the one hand, one might argue that the lower proportional
review of Division I evidences a geographical bias. This is because failure to review an interme-
diate court decision effectively of affirms it. On the other hand, the percentages of the Supreme
Court's actual reversal support an argument that this particular data may be more the result of
coincidence than geographical bias.
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Although Division I actually had the lowest percentage of cases
reversed in their entirety, it also had the lowest percentage of affirmed
decisions. Of the seventy-two decisions reviewed by the supreme
court, thirty-two (44%) were affirmed, twenty-seven (37%) were re-
versed, and thirteen cases (18%) were affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The forty cases reversed in some respect total the highest per-
centage of reversal (62%) of the appellate divisions.
The variation between the percentages of affirmation by the su-
preme court are minimal. However, it does appear that, at least for
the term of the study, there was no geographical bias in favor of the
region from which most of the court's members came. It also appears
that the supreme court is more likely to affirm a decision by its appel-
late colleagues than one on direct review.
2. How Frequently Does the Supreme Court Reverse Lower Court
Rulings?
Initially, the high reversal rate indicated by these numbers and
percentages is somewhat striking. One hopes that the law itself had a
certain amount of clarity to it. One further hopes that appellate judges
(at whatever level) would interpret the law similarly, bound by the
same precedents. That the supreme court affirms in full less than 50%
of court of appeals decisions is surprising at first glance. However, it
is probable that those lower court cases likely to be affirmed are denied
a discretionary review by the supreme court. If the law is settled and
was applied correctly by the appellate court, there is no need to hear
the case, much less write an opinion that reads essentially the same as
the lower court's. If the court of appeals decision was published, the
precedent is already set. That being so, the supreme court need not
bind itself as well. The supreme court should only exercise its discre-
tionary review when the law is unclear or contradictory. In such cases,
disagreements among appellate jurists is likely.
B. Which Justices Are Most Often in the Majority?
Table 2' contains statistics on the number of times each justice
voted with the majority. For this study, voting with the majority
could be done in either of the following: (1) writing or signing onto the
majority opinion; or (2) writing or signing onto a concurring opinion.
One justice stands out as being on the majority side more than any
other. Justice Smith was on the majority 216 times out of the 228
opinions he participated in, almost 95% of the time. Second was Jus-
7. See infra App. B.
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tice Bridge at almost 90%, followed by Justice Guy at 88%, and Jus-
tices Ireland and Durham at 87%. Of course, none of this indicates
who are the leaders or the followers among this group. However, cer-
tain justices are clearly not followers. Justice Sanders agreed with the
majority only 71% of the time, and Justice Johnson agreed with only
just over 80% of the majority opinions.
1. How Often Do the Justices Write Opinions?
During the study period, the court published 234 opinions. Of
these, seventy-eight (exactly one-third) were unanimous and four were
issued per curiam.
a. Majority Opinions
Table 2 shows the number of majority opinions written by each
justice. With one exception, each member wrote about the same
number of majority opinions. Those sitting on the court for the dura-
tion of the study wrote between twenty-two and twenty-nine majority
opinions. The one exception was Justice Madsen, who wrote thirty-
six majority opinions. When one considers the number of times Jus-
tice Madsen signed onto majority opinions, it accentuates this differ-
ence. Of those one hundred seventy opinions, Justice Madsen wrote
thirty-six, or 21% of the majority opinions with which she agreed. In
contrast, Justices Alexander, Talmadge, and Johnson wrote just over
16%.
Unfortunately, these are merely numbers and do not explain the
reasons for the disparity. Several possible explanations that may ac-
count for this disparity, either singularly or combined, are listed be-
low:
1. One justice may volunteer to write the opinion more than the
others.
2. A justice may be considered to have expertise in an area like
criminal law where there might be more (and shorter) opinions
to write. This explanation seems plausible, given that Justice
Madsen served as both a prosecutor and a defender. Fur-
thermore, her experience as a Seattle Municipal Court judge
likely exposed her to a heavier and more varied caseload than
the other justices.
3. Other justices may have administrative assignments that place
demands on their time. This is likely true of Chief Justice
[Vol. 25:545
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Guy, who had one of the lowest opinion writing percentages at
11%.
4. A justice may be more particular about what an opinion con-
tains or excludes, so other justices may let her write the opin-
ion rather than modify theirs. This could also be Justice
Madsen's case in that she concurred without opinion six times
during the study period (apparently dissatisfied enough with
the majority opinion not to sign it, but not enough to write
separately).
5. A justice may have antagonized one or more justices, and the
writing assignment is punitive.
6. The higher percentage may simply be random.
There are other possibilities in addition to these speculations.
However, until the justices speak on the issue, one cannot be certain.
Perhaps, the justices would not all agree on the explanation anyway.
b. Concurring Opinions
Concurring opinions, writes one federal court of appeals judge,
are written for more subtle reasons than dissents: "Though certainly
not as threatening as dissents, concurrences raise more collegial eye-
brows, for in writing separately on a matter where the judge thinks the
majority got the result right, she may be thought to be self-indulgent,
single-minded, even childish in her insistence that everything be done
her way."'
As in most courts, concurring opinions are infrequent in Wash-
ington Supreme Court decisions. Of the 234 decisions during the time
of the study, only forty-seven had concurring opinions, and on more
than one occasion, two different concurring opinions were written in
the same case.
What is most striking about these statistics is the lack of balance
in the use of concurrences. In the 228 decisions in which he partici-
pated, Justice Smith neither wrote nor signed onto a concurring opin-
ion.9 Similarly, Justice Guy participated minimally in concurring
8. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1413 (1995).
9. Perhaps the explanation offered by Learned Hand in Gerald Gunther's biography ap-
plies to Justice Smith as well. Hand accepted his colleague's opinions "as they came unless there
was some clear statement of law such as I could not join in. [I] seldom find another opinion
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opinions, writing only one and signing onto three others in 227 deci-
sions. In contrast, Justice Talmadge wrote nineteen concurrences, fol-
lowed by Justices Alexander and Madsen with ten and eight concur-
ring opinions respectively. The other justices rarely wrote concurring
opinions and occasionally signed onto a colleague's concurrence. The
newest justices, Ireland and Bridge, appeared reticent to use concur-
rences (Ireland wrote one and signed onto none; Bridge wrote none
and signed onto three). The latter phenomenon seems logical in that
the new members would try to establish a collegial relationship with
the other members before fully exercising their speech (at least in writ-
ten form). Thus, it appears that the most and least experienced mem-
bers of the high court were least likely to concur, perhaps for different
reasons.
Four of the justices also concurred without opinion at times
(Madsen ten times, Sanders twice, Johnson once, and Talmadge once,
who actually concurred with the dissent without opinion). This odd
notation indicates significant enough disagreement with the majority
opinion that the justice will not sign onto it. Yet, the disagreement is
insufficient to merit comment. Again, this form was not used by ei-
ther the most or least experienced members of the court.
c. Dissenting Opinions
The need for a dissenting opinion is much more straightforward
than that of a concurring opinion. When a justice disagrees with the
result, the justice dissents and must, therefore, give some rationale. If
a justice is the lone dissenting voice, he or she must author the dissent-
ing opinion.
As we expect from his statistics on voting with the majority, Jus-
tice Sanders, who voted with the majority least often, wrote the most
dissenting opinions. Of the sixty-six times he dissented, Justice Sand-
ers wrote an opinion forty-two times. Yet, Justice Johnson, who dis-
sented second most often (forty-four times), authored only twelve
opinions. In contrast, Justice Talmadge wrote thirty-two dissenting
opinions while dissenting thirty-nine times. One might surmise that,
when Talmadge disagreed, he wanted to state precisely why. His rela-
tively high number of concurring opinions supports this speculation.
Other justices seem to take the opposite approach. For example,
Justice Bridge dissented eleven times, but never authored a dissenting
which [sic] says the thing as I should have." GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN
AND THE JUDGE 298 (1994).
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opinion.1" Similarly, Justice Smith voted with the dissent twelve times
and authored only one dissenting opinion, which was only a single
paragraph. 1 One explanation for some justices' disinterest in writing
dissents is that they may believe that, since the dissenting opinion
does not establish precedent, its rationale is not as important as the
fact that the justice does not side with the majority.
Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part were infre-
quent. While only Justices Smith and Bridge never signed onto such
opinions, only five justices wrote them. Justice Madsen wrote six con-
cur/dissents, Justice Alexander five, Justices Sanders and Talmadge
each wrote three, and Justice Johnson wrote one. For purposes of this
study, we treated these opinions as disagreeing with both the majority
and dissenting opinions.
2. Are There Voting Blocs Within the Court? Are There "Swing"
Justices?
Tables 3A through 3J 12 contain statistics on the voting alignment
of the justices. Because of the personnel change from Justice Durham
to Justice Bridge during the term, the sampling for those two is
smaller and may be less reliable. Alignments ranged from nearly 95%
agreement to a low of just below 55% (agreement in this context is
agreement in result rather than with the opinion).
The highest percentage of alignment (94.5%) was between Jus-
tices Durham and Ireland. It is followed by that between Justices Guy
and Bridge (90.5%), and Durham and Talmadge (90%). These pair-
ings were followed by Justices Talmadge and Bridge (89%), and Jus-
tices Talmadge and Ireland (88%).
The five lowest percentages of alignment all involve Justice
Sanders. His percentage of agreement with Justice Durham was 54.5%
and was 55% with Justice Talmadge. Those were followed by his per-
centage of agreement with Justice Guy (61%) and Justices Ireland and
10. As mentioned in the text, a possible explanation for Justice Bridge's limited number of
dissenting opinions is her recent appointment to the bench. There is evidence that, during a jus-
tice's early days on the court, he or she tends to agree with others, even if in dissent. The reason
is probably the desire to be collegial and foster positive relations with the other justices. For ex-
ample, this study began with Justice Ireland's first term on the court. Although during the
course of the study term she wrote nine dissenting opinions, she wrote nearly all of them after her
first year on the court (Vol. 137 = 0; Vol. 138 = 0; Vol. 139 = 2; Vol. 140 = 0; Vol. 141 = 6; Vol.
142 = 1).
11. Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, 140 Wash. 2d 143, 995 P.2d 35 (2000).
Essentially, Smith's opinion says that the other dissenting opinion (twenty-eight pages in Wash-
ington Reports) by Justice Sanders is too expansive for Justice Smith to sign onto. Id. at 200, 995
P.2d at 95.
12. See infra Appendix B.
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Bridge (63.5% and 64.5% respectively). Following the Sanders per-
centages, the lowest levels of agreement were between Justices Dur-
ham and Johnson (66%), followed by Justices Durham and Madsen
(66.5%), Justices Alexander and Talmadge (67%), and Justices John-
son and Bridge (67.5%).
There are some intriguing observations we can make from these
numbers. First, although Justice Smith was in the majority more than
any other justice, his percentage of alignment with any particular jus-
tice was not especially high. His percentages ranged from 84% (with
five different justices) to 72.5% (with Justice Sanders). Second, in
evaluating Justice Sanders' high percentages, he aligns with Justices
Johnson and Alexander (both at 80%). Justices Johnson and Alexan-
der agree with each other at a relatively high 85.5% rate.
This evidence may indicate that there is a cohesive group of jus-
tices that includes or included Justices Durham, Guy, Talmadge, Ire-
land, and Bridge. That group of five, however, is essentially a group
of four, given that Justice Bridge replaced Justice Durham. The low-
est level of agreement within this group is 86% (Guy and Talmadge).
There is another group of justices that is less cohesive, including Jus-
tices Johnson, Alexander, and at its fringe, Sanders. These three all
have a relatively high alignment with each other and a relatively low
alignment with the above group.
Finally, Justices Smith and Madsen appear to be swing votes.
Neither justice has a particularly high alignment with either group of
justices. That Justice Smith is a swing vote is supported by the fact
that he is in the majority most often. His vote, when added to the first
group, makes that the majority position. The theory of Justice
Madsen as a swing vote may explain the high percentage of majority
opinions she authored. Being the vote that the plurality needs to make
it a majority, she may be able to bargain certain items into the opinion.
At that point, the plurality may agree but have her write the opinion
to her satisfaction. The swing vote theory may also explain why Jus-
tice Madsen concurs at the level that she does and does so at times
without opinion.
If the above is true, there may be changing times ahead for the
court. Two of the plurality group have retired and were replaced dur-
ing the most recent election. If either of the new justices does not join
that group, the balance may shift. That has yet to be seen.
Of course, none of the above suggests that any justice votes
strictly according to some all-encompassing philosophical agreement
with certain others on the court. It does suggest, however, that there
may be patterns; and that these patterns may be more prevalent in
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particular types of cases. We will explore that possibility more fully in
the next section.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. A Case Study of Seven Criminal Law Cases
An examination of twenty-two closely divided criminal law deci-
sions confirms the general patterns noted above.13 The examination
also suggests that when two justices from the plurality group retire,
and Justices Chambers and Owens replace them, this replacement
may impact the law in this area. In these twenty-two cases, Justices
Bridge (16-0) and Ireland (21-0) voted in favor of the government in
every case in which they sat; and Chief Justice Guy (20-1) and Justice
Talmadge (18-1) voted in favor of the government almost 95% of the
time in the cases in which they sat. Only slightly less cohesive, a four-
justice bloc almost always voted in favor of the defendant: Justice
Sanders (22-0); Justice Johnson (21-1); Justice Madsen (17-5); and
Chief Justice Alexander (17-5). The swing justice was Smith, who
sided with the government twelve times and with the defendant ten
times. Not surprisingly, the government prevailed on appeal in six-
teen of these cases.
A careful reading of the cases confirms the hypothesis that the
two blocs bring fundamentally different perspectives to the decision of
these cases. Those perspectives were described more than a quarter
century ago by Herbert Packer in his classic study of the criminal
process: one believes that justice depends on enforcing law and order;
the other, that it depends on observing due process. 4 An effective and
13. Sixteen of the twenty-two were five to four, four were six to three, and two were five to
three. The five to four cases are State v. Demery, 144 Wash. 2d 753, 30 P.3d 1278 (2001); State
v. Keller, 143 Wash. 2d 267, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001); In re Quackenbush, 142 Wash. 2d 928, 16 P.3d
638 (2001); Statev. Cronin, 142 Wash. 2d 568, 14 P.3d 752 (2000); Statev. Williams, 142 Wash.
2d 17, 11 P.3d 714 (2000); Statev. Greiff, 141 Wash. 2d 910, 10 P.3d 390 (2000); Statev. Brad-
ley, 141 Wash. 2d 731, 10 P.3d 358 (2000); State v. Perez- Cervantes, 141 Wash. 2d 468, 6 P.3d
1160 (2000); State v. Anderson, 141 Wash. 2d 357, 5 P.3d 1247 (2000); State v. McCarty, 140
Wash. 2d 420, 998 P.2d 296 (2000); State v. Taylor, 140 Wash. 2d 229, 996 P.2d 571 (2000);
State v. Cruz, 139 Wash. 2d 186, 985 P.2d 384 (1999) (Kennedy, Justice Pro Tem joining in dis-
sent); State v. Brown, 139 Wash. 2d 20, 983 P.2d 608 (1999); State v. Bustamante-Davila, 138
Wash. 2d 964, 983 P.2d 590 (1999); State v. West, 139 Wash. 2d 37, 983 P.2d 37 (1999); and
State v. Robinson, 138 Wash. 2d 753, 982 P.2d 590 (1999). The six to three cases are In re
Becker, 143 Wash. 2d 491, 20 P.3d 409 (2001) (Gross, Justice Pro Tem joining in majority);
State v. Atsbeha, 142 Wash. 2d 904, 16 P.3d 626 (2001); In re Meyer, 142 Wash. 2d 608, 16 P.3d
563 (2001); and State v. Roberts, 142 Wash. 2d 471, 14 P.3d 713 (2001). The five to three cases
are In re Dyer, 143 Wash. 2d 384, 20 P.3d 907 (2001); and State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486,
987 P.2d 73 (1999) (Dolliver, Justice Pro Tem joining in dissent).
14. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-73 (1968).
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fair criminal justice system rests on a wise balancing of both these
competing values, and it is thus not surprising that, in close cases, the
court splits along these lines.
Seven cases clearly illustrate this tension. First, State v. Ander-
son is involves a recurrent problem in the criminal law: how should a
court construe a criminal statute? More particularly, the issue was
whether "knowing possession" is an element of unlawful possession of
a firearm. The defendant, who had been stopped for a traffic viola-
tion, was arrested and searched when officers learned there was an
outstanding warrant for his arrest.16 In conducting a search incident to
arrest, they found a handgun under the driver's seat and, since Ander-
son had a prior felony conviction, charged him with unlawful posses-
sion of a firearm.17 At trial, Anderson claimed both the car and the
gun belonged to his cousin, and that he did not know the gun was un-
der the seat. 8
The majority, per Justice Alexander, held that knowing posses-
sion was an element of the offense.19 While conceding that the legisla-
ture may create strict liability crimes, the majority acknowledged that
criminal offenses with no mental element are generally disfavored, es-
pecially where substantial punishment is imposed.2"
Justice Ireland, writing for the minority, emphasized that the leg-
islature had concluded that "'[s]tate efforts at reducing violence must
include changes in criminal penalties, reducing the unlawful use of
and access to firearms."' 21 Thus, the legislature could reasonably con-
clude that strict liability was necessary and the statutory language was
consistent with that intent. Finally, the dissent insisted that the ma-
jority's concern that innocent persons might be unfairly ensnared was
"ameliorated by the availability of unwitting possession as an affirma-
tive defense."22 Concluding, Justice Ireland accused the majority of
"rewrit[ing] a statute it deems unduly harsh."23
While Anderson represented a victory for the due process bloc,
the crime control bloc prevailed in the remaining six cases, beginning
with State v. Bustamante-Davilla.24  Like Anderson, Bustamante-
Davilla involved a recurrent problem that frequently divides the crime
15. Anderson, 141 Wash. 2d 357, 5 P.3d 1247.
16. Id. at 359, 5 P.3d at 1249.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 364, 5 P.3d at 1251.
20. Id. at 363, 5 P.3d at 1251.
21. Id. at 370, 5 P.3d at 1254 (citing 1994 Wash. Laws 7-101).
22. Id. at 371, 5 P.3d at 1255.
23. Id. at 373, 5 P.3d at 1255-56.
24. 138 Wash. 2d 964, 983 P.2d 590 (1999).
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control and due process blocs: when may the police appropriately
search a suspect and/or his home?2 The police had gone to the de-
fendant's home to arrest him under a removal order issued by an im-
migration judge. 26 When they arrived, they asked if they could enter
the defendant's mobile home. He responded, "Yeah, come in. "27
When they did, they saw a rifle.28 Knowing the defendant was a con-
victed felon and, therefore, prohibited from having a gun,29 the officers
arrested him and charged him with unlawful possession of a firearm.3"
Complicating facts aside, the issue boiled down to this: was the
ensuing search and seizure illegal because the officers did not advise
the defendant that he could refuse entry? In the face of State v. Fer-
rier,3 which construed the state constitution to require officers with-
out a search warrant to follow a "knock and talk" process that ensures
that the defendant gave informed consent,3 2 the majority, per Justice
Smith, found the search and seizure lawful. Relying on one factor-
the education and intelligence of the defendant--of a three factor, to-
tality of the circumstances test, the majority concluded that he gave an
informed consent.33 Those who place a premium on crime control are
naturally loathe to let an obviously guilty person escape because the
constable was not as punctilious as he might have been.34
The four dissenters, through Justice Alexander, were dismayed
that the majority ignored the "letter and spirit"3 of Ferrier and the de-
fendant's compelling privacy interest in his home. Since, in their
view, the officers had no right to enter the defendant's home, the trial
court should have suppressed the weapon, though in plain view, and
dismissed the charge: "The fact that the rifle was seized pursuant to
the plain view exception to the warrant requirement avails the officers
only if they had a right to be where they were when the contraband
was viewed."36 It is hardly surprising that the due process bloc would
place a high premium on privacy and insist that the police respect it. 37
25. PACKER, supra note 14, at 199-200.
26. Bustamante-Davilla, 138 Wash. 2d at 967, 983 P.2d at 591.
27. Id. at 969, 983 P.2d at 592.
28. Id. at 969, 983 P.2d at 593.
29. Id. at 970, 983 P.2d at 593.
30. Id. at 969-70, 983 P.2d at 592-93.
31. 136 Wash. 2d 103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998).
32. Id. at 106, 960 P.2d at 928.
33. Bustamante-Davilla, 138 Wash. 2d at 981-82, 983 P.2d at 599.
34. PACKER, supra note 14, at 178. Under the crime control model, "[t]he one kind of
sanction that should be completely inadmissible is... suppression of evidence." Id.
35. Bustamante-Davilla, 138 Wash. 2d at 984-85, 983 P.2d at 600.
36. Id. at 987, 983 P.2d at 601.
37. PACKER, supra note 14, at 180. Under the due process model, "any evidence that is
obtained directly or indirectly [by the police] should be suppressed." Id.; see also id. at 196-97.
2002]
Seattle University Law Review
Protecting the community from sex offenders and career crimi-
nals is another area in which crime control and due process values
clash. Two such cases sharply divided the court; and, in each, the
crime control bloc prevailed. In In re Meyer,38 Meyer, Erickson, and
Sundstrom, three sex offenders, claimed that registration and commu-
nity notification procedures violated their rights to due process. Basi-
cally, the petitioners argued that the protection of their liberty inter-
ests entitled them to a hearing before their risk level was determined
and information about them distributed to the community.39 Justice
Talmadge, writing for a six person majority, disagreed, emphasizing
by analogy to prisoner rights cases that the petitioners' liberty interests
were circumscribed.4" Moreover, he argued that "these statutes were
not punitive and did not create an affirmative disability or restraint on
sex offenders."41 Talmadge was equally dismissive of the petitioners'
assertion of privacy rights. Their interest in "avoiding stigma or pro-
tecting reputation ... does not give rise to a liberty interest."42 Fur-
ther, the justices noted that the information is a matter of public re-
cord.43 Moreover, they noted, as those concerned with crime control
would, that the public has a substantial interest in knowing when "po-
tentially dangerous individuals" are living in the neighborhood.44
Speaking once again through Justice Alexander, the three person
minority insisted that fundamental fairness required a hearing, par-
ticularly in view of the largely untrammeled discretion of state officials
to determine risk classifications and make disclosure decisions:
When a government agency focuses its machinery on the task of
determining whether a person should be labeled publicly as hav-
ing a certain undesirable characteristic or belonging to a certain
undesirable group, and that agency must by law gather and syn-
thesize evidence outside the public record in making that deter-
mination, the interest of the person to be labeled goes beyond
mere reputation. The interests cannot be captured in a single
word or phrase. It is an interest in knowing when the govern-
ment is moving against you and why it has singled you out for
special attention. It is an interest in avoiding the secret machi-
nations of a Star Chamber. Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, it is an interest in avoiding the social ostracism, loss of
employment opportunities, and significant likelihood of verbal
38. 142 Wash. 2d 608, 16 P.3d 563 (2001).
39. Id. at 611-12, 16 P.3dat 564-65.
40. Id. at 617, 16 P.3d at 567.
41. Id. at 619, 16 P.3d at 568.
42. Id. at 620, 16 P.3d at 569.
43. Id. at 621, 16 P.3d at 569.
44. Id. See generally PACKER, supra note 14, at 23-24, 253-56.
[Vol. 25:545
Supreme Court in Transition
and, perhaps, even physical harassment likely to follow from
designation. In our view, that interest, when combined with the
obvious reputational interest that is at stake, qualified as a "lib-
erty" interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.45
The dissenting opinion thus reinforces the importance that the
due process bloc attributes to ensuring fairness in the criminal justice
system. 46
Another criminal case, State v. Keller,47 involved a defendant
who was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Persistent Offender
Accountability Act48 (POAA, habitual offender statute, or "three
strikes and you're out law" by other names) after having been con-
victed of vehicular assault and felony hit and run. In Keller, the ma-
jority, again speaking through Justice Smith, held that two prior felony
convictions could be counted as two prior convictions under POAA
although they previously counted as a single offense in calculating the
defendant's offender score for purposes of sentencing.49 Conse-
quently, the defendant was now subject to life imprisonment under
the three strikes law.
For the majority, the issue was simply one of statutory interpre-
tation. Having been allowed to serve his sentences for the two prior
convictions concurrently, the defendant argued they should be
counted as only one offense because a prior statute had said that "for
the purpose of computing the offender score, count all adult convic-
tions served concurrently as one offense.""0 Thus, the court was faced
with the challenge of interpreting the current statute in light of a prior
statute. Invoking numerous variations on the plain and ordinary
meaning rule, the court concluded that the phrase "cannot reasonably
be interpreted to mean anything but what it says.""
Chief Justice Alexander, conceding that the defendant's crimes
were substantial, 2 reached a different conclusion. First, he found the
statute less clear than did the majority. He argued that the majority's
focus on the legislature's intent is misplaced since the three strikes law
45. Id. at 629-30, 16 P.3d at 573-74 (citing Noble v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervi-
sion, 964 P.2d 990, 995-96 (Or. 1998)).
46. Professor Packer stresses that a commitment to equality, which embodies notions of
fairness, is "[a]nother strand in the complex of attitudes underlying the Due Process
Model .... PACKER, supra note 14, at 168.
47. 143 Wash. 2d 267, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001)
48. Former WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(25), .360 (1995).
49. Keller, 143 Wash. 2d at 283, 19 P.3d at 1038.
50. Id. at 272, 19 P.3d at 1033 (citing former § 9.94A.360(6)(c)).
51. Id. at 277, 19 P.3d at 1035.
52. Id. at 283, 19 P.3d at 1039.
2002]
Seattle University Law Review
was a voter initiative and that it is very difficult to discern "any par-
ticular intent on the voters' part with respect to a 'three strikes' law." 3
Second, the Chief Justice invoked the rule of lenity, which holds
that criminal statutes setting out multiple or inconsistent punishments
should be construed in favor of the more lenient punishment, a point
he emphasizes once again at the end of the opinion:
Particularly in light of the fact that a life sentence without the
possibility of parole is at stake here, we should be free of doubt
about the meaning of the statutes in question before we reject
that argument. Because I am left with substantial doubt, I
would resolve the ambiguity in favor of Keller per the rule of
lenity.5 4
Prisoners' claims are another category of cases that often divide
the crime control and due process blocs. In In re Dyer,5s the prisoner
petitioned the court to order prison officials to permit him to partici-
pate in the "extended family visit program." The program allows
prisoners to enjoy conjugal visits in "a private visiting unit."56 Under
current regulations, the prison superintendent has discretion to deny
inmates the opportunity of participating in the program if they "have a
documented history of domestic violence." 57 Dyer did; and, when that
was discovered, his participation was terminated. 8
Justice Ireland, writing for a four person majority, concluded that
neither the Constitution nor state law, i.e., the applicable administra-
tive regulations, created a protected liberty interest. Relying on the
age old right/privilege distinction, Ireland found that participation in
the extended family visit program fell into the latter category. In sup-
port of her conclusion, she cited RCW 72.09.470:
To the greatest extent practical, all inmates shall contribute to
the cost of privileges. The department shall establish standards
by which inmates shall contribute a portion of the department's
capital costs of providing privileges, including television cable
access, extended family visitation, weight lifting, and other rec-
reational sports equipment and supplies.5 9
53. Id. at 287, 19 P.3d at 1040.
54. Id at 287-88, 19 P.3d at 1041.
55. 143 Wash. 2d 384, 20 P.3d 907 (2001).
56. Id. at 388, 20 P.3d at 909.
57. Jd. at 398, 20 P.3d at 915 (citing Division of Prison Directive 590.100(V)(A)(10)).
58. Id. at 390, 20 P.3d at 910.
59. Id. at 393 n.10, 20 P.3d at 912 n.10 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 72.09.470 (2001)) (ci-
tations omitted) (alteration in original).
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She and the other members of the majority were also influenced
by the perceived need to let prison officials manage the prisons: "It is
not in the best interest of the courts to involve themselves in the 'day-
to-day management of prisons, often squandering judicial resources
with little offsetting benefit to anyone. [C]ourts ought to afford ap-
propriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a
volatile environment.' '"60 Finding that the superintendent had not
abused his discretion in view of Dyer's abuse of prior wives, the ma-
jority affirmed the lower court's denial of Dyer's petition.61 Deference
to administrative judgment is a characteristic of those who favor crime
control.
The only member of the due process bloc who never cast a crime
control vote in any of the twenty-three cases, Justice Sanders opened
his dissent with the proclamation: "There is no iron curtain drawn be-
tween the Constitution and the prisons of this country."62 Mincing no
words, he blasted the five person majority:
Notwithstanding the obvious nobility of a prison policy which
assists inmates to maintain their marriages and family ties under
such trying circumstances, the facts of this case illustrate the
human tragedy and suffering imposed not only upon the inmate
but his wife and small children when prison officials cease to
practice the purpose which they have embraced in theory. Simi-
larly, such travesty is not remitted by courts which fail to stand
behind the legal rights of prisoners touting noninvolvement in
the "'day-to-day management of prisons"' as superior to the dis-
charge of their duty to protect the legal rights of every citizen,
including those behind bars.63
Characterizing the record of Dyer's violence as "sparse and self-
contradictory,"64 Justice Sanders insisted that Dyer was entitled to
some "opportunity to participate in a hearing ... where contested
facts could be determined, if only summarily and superficially. 65
Sanders reinforced the emotional appeal of his argument by quoting
letters from Dyer's minor children pleading for the opportunity to see
their father like "other families [do]."66
60. Id. at 393, 20 P.3d at 912 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)).
61. Id. at 398-99, 20 P.3d at 914. See generally PACKER, supra note 14, at 158-63.
62. Id. at 399, 20 P.3d at 914 (citing Wolfv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).
63. Id. at 400-01, 20 P.3d at 915 (citing 143 Wash. 2d at 393, 20 P.3d at 912 (citing
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482)).
64. Id. at 401, 20 P.3d at 916.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 404, 20 P.3d at 917.
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Responding to the majority's dismissal of any liberty interest,
Justice Sanders found that Dyer's earlier participation in the program
had become an ordinary incident of prison life,67 and that the hardship
of its administrative curtailment violated a liberty interest.68 He also
found the denial arbitrary and capricious.69 Justices Alexander and
Johnson joined in his concluding blast: "By allowing the arbitrary
revocation of a regulatory entitlement from this prisoner and his fam-
ily, the majority has walked away from its responsibility to protect the
legal rights of these citizens and whitewashed a travesty of justice."70
Suspicious of bureaucrats, devotees of due process are likely to find
arbitrary behavior whenever they think that the official has acted un-
reasonably.'
State v. Cienfuegos72 is especially interesting because one of the
two new Justices, Justice Chambers, wrote for the crime control
majority. The case involved a habitual drug addict who was charged
with, and convicted of, first degree escape after he bolted from the
custody of officers while returning to jail from the courthouse.73
Shackled, he nevertheless managed to temporarily elude capture, but
was soon found lying under a bush, his head sticking out.74 Despite
evidence at his subsequent trial, including expert testimony, that the
defendant was in an irrational state of mind because he was going
through withdrawal, defense counsel did not request an instruction on
diminished capacity."5
Thus, one issue before the court was whether the failure to re-
quest a diminished capacity instruction amounted to ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, a common claim in criminal appeals. Here, it was
coupled with another: Cienfuegos also claimed that the jury panel did
not fairly represent the ethnic makeup of the county, denying him a
fair trial.76
The majority conceded that the defendant would have been enti-
tled to a diminished capacity instruction had he asked for one. 77 Nev-
ertheless, it found the error harmless:
67. Id. at 406, 20 P.3d at 918.
68. Due process devotees view the taking of a person's liberty as "the heaviest deprivation
that government can inflict on an individual." PACKER, supra note 14, at 165.
69. Dyer, 143 Wash. 2d at 408, 20 P.3d at 919.
70. Id. at 412, 20 P.3d at 921.
71. PACKER, supra note 14, at 163-65.
72. 144 Wash. 2d 222, 25 P.3d 1011 (2001),
73. Id. at 224-25, 25 P.3d at 1013.
74. Id. at 225, 25 P.3d at 1013.
75. Id. at 226, 25 P.3d at 1014.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 228, 25 P.3d at 1015.
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In closing both the prosecutor and defense counsel argued exten-
sively about Cienfuegos's ability to have knowledge or form the
requisite intent. From this instruction, the jury could have
taken into account Cienfuegos's impairment. The diminished
capacity instruction would have highlighted that fact and should
have been given, but even without it defense counsel was able to
argue his theory of the case. Cienfuegos has not met the Strick-
land requirement that his counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive him of a fair trial. Cienfuegos has failed to show that
confidence in counsel to request the diminished capacity instruc-
tion. The jury's verdict has been undermined by the failure of
his. Therefore, Cienfuegos has not shown that he received inef-
fective assistance of counsel in this case."
The harmless error doctrine is frequently invoked by the devo-
tees of crime control. They often point out that the defendant is only
guaranteed a fair trial, not a perfect one.
On the second issue, the representativeness of the jury pool, the
majority discounted the defendant's claim that he was denied informa-
tion about the makeup of jury lists and simply asserted that "nowhere
in our jurisprudence is it suggested a bare allegation that the jury list is
not representative is sufficient to bring this issue into play."79 In so
doing, the majority was invoking a burden of proof doctrine and say-
ing the defendant had not shown enough to establish a factual predi-
cate for his claim. Interestingly, among the justices joining the five
person majority was the other new justice, Justice Owens.
Once again, Chief Justice Alexander spoke for the "due process
four." He insisted that the failure to request the instruction was es-
sentially automatic error, citing State v. Thomas8" for the proposition
that failure of defense counsel to request a diminished capacity in-
struction, where the facts support the instruction, deprives the defen-
dant of a fair trial and requires the case be retried. 8' He also reminded
his colleagues in the majority that, in State v. Griffin,82 they had said
that "' [g]eneralized instructions on criminal intent are not sufficient to
apprise a jury of mental disorders which may diminish a defendant'scapacity to commit a crime.""'3 Basically, the due process four could
not understand how any defendant could be said to have had a fair
78. Id at 230, 25 P.3d at 1016.
79. Id. at 232, 25 P.3d at 1017.
80. 109 Wash. 2d 222, 743 P.2d 816 (1987).
81. Cienfuegos, 144 Wash. 2d at 233, 20 P.3d at 1017.
82. 100 Wash. 2d. 417, 670 P.2d 265 (1983).
83. Cienfuegos, 144 Wash. 2d at 235, 20 P.3d at 1018 (citing Griffin, 100 Wash. 2d at 420,
670 P.2d at 266)
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trial when he was denied the opportunity to raise a defense to which
he was entitled.
The final case, State v. Demery, 8 4 gave Justice Owens her first
opportunity to write for the crime control bloc. The issue before the
court was whether statements made by police officers during a taped
interview accusing the suspect, who later became the defendant, of ly-
ing constituted impermissible opinion testimony.85 The issue arose
because the trial judge admitted over the defense counsel's objection a
taped, post-arrest interview of the defendant, including the following
colloquy:
[Detective:] How have you been treated since you've been here?
[Defendant:] I've been treated all right .... [Y]ou guys are
lookin' at me .... like I'm lying.
[Detective:] 'Cause you are.
[Defendant:] Oh.86
The majority affirmed the defendant's conviction even though it
conceded that "witnesses are not permitted to testify regarding the ve-
racity of another witness because such testimony invades the province
of the jury .... 7 Moreover, the majority acknowledged that "[s]uch
testimony from a law enforcement officer may be especially preju-
diced." 8 In this case, however, the majority emphasized three coun-
terbalancing considerations. One, the officers' statements did not
carry "a special aura of reliability" because they were simply part of a"commonly used police interview technique."" Two, the comments
were offered solely to provide the jury with a context within which to
understand and evaluate the defendant's responses.9" Third, some-
what surprisingly, the majority rejected the argument that the judge
should have given a curative instruction admonishing the jurors not to
take into account the police comments in determining his veracity. 91
Thus, the majority concluded that the police statements were not"impermissible opinion testimony. "92
Predictably, Justice Sanders was outraged, stating: "The majority
concludes a recorded expression of an officer's opinion that a suspect
84. 144 Wash. 2d 753, 30 P.3d 1278 (2001).
85. Id. at 754, 30 P.3d at 1280.
86. Id. at 756 n.2, 30 P.3d at 1280 n.2.
87. Id. at 764, 30 P.3d at 1285.
88. Id. at 765, 30 P.3d at 1285.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 764, 30 P.3d at 1284.
91. Id. at 762, 30 P.3d at 1283.
92. Id. at 765, 30 P.3d at 1285.
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is lying is admissible at trial even though the same officer would not
be permitted to offer such an opinion in live testimony. I see no dis-
tinction between the two."93 Citing chapter and verse in support of his
conclusion, Justice Sanders argued (1) that Washington's evidentiary
rules plainly forbade the introduction of such evidence and (2) that
Washington case law clearly supported the conclusion that the trial
judge should have excluded it. Finally, Sanders characterized the ma-
jority's conclusion that a curative instruction was not needed "'be-
cause the jury clearly understood from the officers' testimony that the
statements were offered solely to provide context . . . . ' as incredi-
ble. According to Sanders, such a conclusion requires the abilities of a
mind-reader. He conceded he lacked those abilities and expressed
profound doubts that the majority enjoyed them. Thus, Sanders con-
cluded: "There is no meaningful difference between permitting the
jury to hear an officer directly call a defendant a liar in open court and
permitting the jury to hear an officer call a defendant a liar on a tape
recording."9"
The usual due process justices, Chief Justice Alexander and Jus-
tices Johnson, Madsen, and Sanders disagreed on the merits.96 So, too,
interestingly, did Justice Chambers. His was nevertheless the minor-
ity opinion because the Chief Justice found the trial judge's error
harmless.97
B. Evaluation and Conclusion
Each of these seven cases involved issues of major importance to
the fair and effective administration of criminal justice in the courts of
this state. On such questions, which are generally similar in impor-
tance to the issues raised in the other sixteen cases examined, the
Washington Supreme Court appears to be narrowly divided. These
cases dramatize three facts. First, all the justices favor a fair and effec-
tive criminal justice system. The crime control bloc may emphasize
effectiveness more because they understand that the purpose of the
criminal justice system is to ensure a safe and secure public order.
The due process bloc may emphasize fairness more because they be-
lieve that the preservation of individual liberty requires the state to
prove the defendant's guilt only by procedures that respect his liberty
interests.
93. Id. at 767, 30 P.3d at 1286.
94. Id. at 771, 30 P.3d at 1288.
95. Id. at 773, 30 P.3d at 1288-89.
96. Id. at 767, 30 P.3d at 1286.
97. Id. at 765-67, 30 P.3d at 1285-86 (Alexander, J., concurring).
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Second, the blocs thus bring two different philosophical perspec-
tives to their resolution of particular claims. The crime control bloc is
more willing to defer to the expertise of those who operate the criminal
justice system. The due process bloc, having less confidence in that
expertise, often favors more fact finding hearings in order to make sure
the "expert" judgment is in fact correct. The due process bloc is also
more likely to focus on the rights of the defendant and define them
more broadly while the crime control bloc is inclined to give greater
weight to the safety interests of the community.
Last, the balance of power between the two blocs may shift in
coming years. Justices Chambers and Owens may simply slip into the
robes left by Chief Justice Guy and Justice Talmadge. As a result, the
crime control bloc will continue to prevail more often than not, relying
most often on Justice Smith or occasionally on Justice Madsen or
Chief Justice Alexander for that necessary fifth vote. But one case
does not a judicial career make, and it is probably too soon to conclude
that the new justices, like the ones they replaced, value crime control
more than due process.98 If even one of them jumps the crime control
ship, the sails of the due process ship will swell as the rough currents
of the criminal law shift in favor of the due process crew. Cienfuegos
and Demery offer a tantalizing but inclusive insight into that possibil-
ity.
98. The career of Justice Sanders certainly illustrates the truth of this assertion. In an ear-
lier study of the Washington Supreme Court's use of the Gunwall doctrine in criminal cases,
Silva counted Sanders a 100% pro-government conservative because the then newest justice
joined a unanimous court in sustaining the government's case. See Silva, supra note 2, at 1909.
The author's larger conclusions, however, generally support ours. She found Guy (91%), Dur-
ham (92%), Talmadge (67%), and Smith (64%) to be strongly to moderately conservative. Jus-
tices Alexander (80%) and Johnson (70%), on the other hand, tended to vote liberally. Justice
Madsen was the swing vote, joining the conservative half the time and the liberals the other half.
See id. These relatively slight percentage differences are best explained by Ms. Silva's looking at
all criminal cases involving Gunwall, including ones where the court was unanimous or nearly so,
whereas we focused on criminal cases where the court was closely divided. In the latter cases,
where the controlling and precedent law are presumably less clear, the justices' ideological pref-
erences more strongly influence their final judgment. See Silva, supra note 2.
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APPENDIX A:
BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES OF THE JUSTICES
During the span of this study, there were ten members of the su-
preme court. The following basic biographies are intended to give
readers who are not familiar with the justices some background on
them. The biographies are limited to the following: years on the
bench; prior jobs; whether the justice was appointed, elected, or both;
geographical representation; and any obvious party affiliation.
Barbara Durham: Elected to supreme court in 1984. Court of
appeals judge (Division I), 1980-84. King County Superior Court
Judge, 1977-80. Mercer Island District Court Judge, 1973-77. Prior
to that, Deputy Prosecutor. 99
Richard P. Guy: Appointed to supreme court in 1989 (Gover-
nor Gardner, Democrat).'00 Elected 1990 and 1994. Private practice
with business law firm, 1981-89. Spokane County Superior Court
Judge, 1977-81. Prior to that, Chief Criminal Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney for Spokane County and State Attorney General's Office.
Retired from supreme court 2000.101
Charles Z. Smith: Appointed to supreme court in 1988 (Gover-
nor Gardner, Democrat). °2 Elected 1988, 1990, and 1996. Prior to
that, private practice and Associate Dean and Professor at University
of Washington School of Law. King County Superior Court Judge,
1966-73. Seattle Municipal Court Judge, 1965-66. Special Assistant
to United States Attorney General, 1960-64. Prosecuting Attorney
for King County, 1956-60.'1°
Charles W. Johnson: Elected to supreme court in 1991 and
1996. Prior to that, private practice (general practice). Sat as pro tern
judge in Pierce County.0 4
Gerry L. Alexander: Elected to supreme court in 1994 and
2000.1' s Court of appeals judge (Division II), 1985-94. Superior
99. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR AND THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON STATE YEARBOOK 12 (Richard Yates & Charity Yates eds., 1999).
100. State Supreme Court Justices' Biographies: A Look at Court Members and their Initiative
Decisions, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 17, 2000, at A18 [hereinafter Biographies].
101. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR AND THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON STATE YEARBOOK 11 (Richard Yates & Charity Yates eds., 2000) [hereinafter
YEARBOOK 2000].
102. Biographies, supra note 100.
103. YEARBOOK 2000, supra note 101.
104. Id. at 12.
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Court Judge for Thurston and Mason Counties, 1973-84. Prior to
that, private practice. 0 6
Richard B. Sanders: Elected to supreme court in 1995 and
1998. Prior to that, private practice (including litigation). Home in
King County.'07
Barbara A. Madsen: Elected 1992 and 1998. Seattle Municipal
Court Judge, 1988-92. Prior to that, Seattle Municipal Court Com-
missioner. Prior to that, Seattle City Attorney's Office. Prior to that
criminal defense attorney. Home in Pierce County." 8
Phillip A. Talmadge: Elected to supreme court in 1994.
Washington State Senate, 1979-95. Contemporaneous private prac-
tice (concentration on appeals). Retired from supreme court in
2000.1"9 Home in King County."0
Faith Ireland: Elected to supreme court in 1998. King County
Superior Court Judge, 1984-98. Prior to that, private practice (general
practice). Home in King County."'
Bobbe J. Bridge: Appointed to supreme court in 1999 (Gover-
nor Locke, Democrat). Elected in 2000. King County Superior Court
Judge, 1990-2000. Prior to that, partner in law firm practice (civil
practice). Home in King County." 2
Tom Chambers: Elected to supreme court in 2000. Prior to
that, attorney in private practice (litigation). Home in King County."'
Susan Owens: Elected to supreme court in 2000. Prior to that,
District Court Judge in Western Clallam County (nineteen years).
Also, Chief Judge of Quileute Tribe (five years)and Chief Judge of
Lower Elwha S'Klallam Tribe (six years). Home in Clallam County
(Olympic Peninsula)." 4
105. State Supreme Court: O1wens over Sullivan in Close Race for Supreme Court Justice,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at B10.
106. YEARBOOK 2000, supra note 101, at 12.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Seven Vie for Supreme Court in Election Free-for-All, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 10, 2000,
at Bi.
110. YEARBOOK 2000, supra note 101, at 12.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 13.
113. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR AND THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON STATE YEARBOOK 14-15 (Scott D. Dwyer & Mary B. Dwyer eds., 2001)
114. Id. at 15.
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APPENDIX B:
TABLE 1: COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRM/REVERSE PERCENTAGES
(BY DIVISION)
T'li~nin I Thiv; nn ITT fli rprt R pvpw
WJ W) W ) W W W
Vol. W W -1
137 3 4 0 3 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 1
138 7 6 4 6 7 1 3 4 0 4 3 1
139 4 2 2 3 6 1 0 2 2 4 5 2
140 4 3 2 6 4 0 3 2 0 4 2 1
141 6 4 1 3 9 0 4 2 0 1 1 3
142 4 4 2 6 2 1 2 1 0 2 4 5
143 4 4 2 3 0 0 1 3 0 4 3 2
Total 32 27 13 30 28 4 15 15 2 19 19 15
% 44% 37% 18% 48% 45% 6% 47% 47% 6% 36% 36% 28%
In;,r; ;nn T
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TABLE 2: NUMBER OF TIMES JUSTICE IN MAJORITY
Cj)
r
0
0
7-
rMi
"0r
Maj. Written 6 22 26 28 29 23 36 26 24 9
Maj. Signed 38 174 190 147 147 125 134 134 153 82
Total Maj. Op. 44 196 216 175 176 148 170 160 177 91
Con. Written 1 1 0 3 10 4 8 19 1 0
Con. Signed 2 3 0 6 4 7 5 4 0 3
Con. w/o Op. 0 0 0 1 0 2 10 0 0 0
Total Con. 3 4 0 10 14 13 23 23 1 3Total Maj.Decision 47 200 216 185 190 161 193 183 178 93*
Con./Dis.
Written 0 0 0 1 5 3 6 3 0 0
Con./Dis.
Signed 1 4 0 3 3 4 1 0 1 0
Total Con./Dis 1 4 0 4 8 7 7 3 1 0
Dis. Written 1 4 1 11 13 39 11 29 10 0
Dis. Signed 5 19 11 29 16 20 19 6 14 11
Total Dis. 7 27 12 44 37 66 30 39" 25 11
Total
Participation 54 227 228 230 227 227 230 222 203 104
Percent. Maj. 87% 88% 95% 80% 84% 71% 84% 82% 87% 89%
Dec.I
* The total majority opinions (ninety-one) and the total concurring opinions (three) do not
add up to the total majority decisions (ninety-three). This is because Justice Bridge signed onto
both the majority and concurring opinions in Kucera v. State Dep't of Transp., 140 Wash. 2d
200, 995 P.2d 63 (2000). She was counted once in each category for purposes of this study.
However, she is only counted as siding with the majority decision once for the case.
** Includes one case where Justice Talmadge concurred in the result of dissent without
opinion.
Supreme Court in Transition
TABLE 3A: JUSTICE DURHAM ALIGNMENT STATISTICS
Guy 44 2 7 46 87%
Smith 43 3 9 46 83.5%
Johnson 31 4 18 35 66%
Alexander 35 1 16 36 69%
Sanders 26 3 24 29 54.5%
Madsen 30 6 18 36 66.5%
Talmadge 42 4 5 46 90%
Ireland 34 1 2 35 94.5%
Bridge N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
TABLE 3B: JUSTICE GUY ALIGNMENT STATISTICS
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Durham 44 2 7 46 87%
Smith 184 4 37 188 83.5%
Johnson 147 12 69 159 70%
Alexander 159 7 20 166 73.5%
Sanders 123 14 88 137 61%
Madsen 163 23 42 186 81.5%
Talmadge 170 19 31 189 86%
Ireland 169 3 27 172 86.5%
Bridge 93 1 10 94 90.5%
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TABLE 3C: JUSTICE SMITH ALIGNMENT STATISTICS
"o - -)
0 00
00o
Durham 43 3 9 46 83.5%
Guy 184 4 37 188 83.5%
Johnson 179 10 38 189 83.5%
Alexander 173 10 45 183 80.5%
Sanders 151 12 62 163 72.5%
Madsen 164 21 44 185 81%
Talmadge 155 22 43 177 80.5%
Ireland 168 1 32 169 84%
Bridge 85 2 17 87 83.5%
TABLE 3D: JUSTICE JOHNSON ALIGNMENT STATISTICS
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Durham 31 4 18 35 66%
Guy 147 12 69 159 69.5%
Smith 179 10 38 189 83.5%
Alexander 185 11 33 196 85.5%
Sanders 168 14 45 182 80%
Madsen 160 21 49 181 78.5%
Talmadge 132 24 67 156 70%
Ireland 138 9 54 147 73%
Bridge 63 7 34 70 67.5%
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TABLE 3E: JUSTICE ALEXANDER ALIGNMENT STATISTICS
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Durham 35 1 16 36 69%
Guy 159 7 60 166 73.5%
Smith 173 10 42 183 81.5%
Johnson 185 11 33 196 85.5%
Sanders 166 15 45 181 80%
Madsen 159 24 46 183 80%
Talmadge 126 21 73 147 67%
Ireland 137 9 55 146 72.5%
Bridge 69 6 29 75 72%
TABLE 3F: JUSTICE SANDERS ALIGNMENT STATISTICS
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Durham 26 3 24 29 54.5%
Guy 123 14 88 137 61%
Smith 151 12 62 163 72.5%
Johnson 168 14 45 182 80%
Alexander 166 15 45 181 80%
Madsen 144 24 60 168 73.5%
Talmadge 97 24 100 121 55%
Ireland 117 11 73 128 63.5%
Bridge 59 8 37 67 64.5%
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TABLE 3G: JUSTICE MADSEN ALIGNMENT STATISTICS
Durham 30 6 18 36 66.5%
Guy 163 23 42 186 81.5%
Smith 164 21 44 185 81%
Johnson 160 21 49 181 78.5%
Alexander 159 24 46 183 80%
Sanders 144 24 60 168 73.5%
Talmadge 129 35 59 164 73.5%
Ireland 134 21 48 155 76.5%
Bridge 74 11 19 85 81.5%
TABLE 3H: JUSTICE TALMADGE ALIGNMENT STATISTICS
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00o W
Durham 42 4 5 46 90%
Guy 170 19 31 189 86%
Smith 155 22 43 177 80.5%
Johnson 132 24 67 156 70%
Alexander 126 21 73 147 67%
Sanders 97 24 100 121 55%
Madsen 129 35 59 164 73.5%
Ireland 157 15 23 172 88%
Bridge 79 8 11 87 89%
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TABLE 31: JUSTICE IRELAND ALIGNMENT STATISTICS
0 -
Durham 34 1 2 35 94.S%
Guy 169 3 27 172 86.5%
Smith 168 1 32 169 84%
Johnson 138 9 54 147 74%
Alexander 137 9 55 146 72.5%
Sanders 117 11 73 128 63.5%
Madsen 134 21 48 155 76.5%
Talmadge 157 3s 23 172 88%
Bridge 192 11 7 1 93 693%
TABLE 3J: JUSTICE BRIDGE ALIGNMENT STATISTICS
0.u
oo o
COD
Durham N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Guy 93 1 10 94 90.5%
Smith 85 2 17 87 83.5%
Johnson 63 7 34 70 67.5%
Alexander 69 6 29 75 72%
Sanders 59 8 37 67 64.5%
Madsen 74 11 19 85 81.5%
Talmadge 79 8 11 87 89%
Ireland 92 1 7 93 93%
